CORRESP
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Hubbell
Incorporated 584 Derby Milford Road
P. O. Box 549
Orange, CT 06477-0589
203-799-4100 |
September 21, 2007
Perry J. Hindin, Esq.
Special Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
United States Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, D.C. 20549-6010
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Re: |
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Hubbell Incorporated Response to Comment Letter dated
August 21, 2007
Definitive 14A Proxy Statement filed March 20, 2007 (Proxy
Statement)
File No. 001-02958 |
Dear Mr. Hindin:
The following represents Hubbell Incorporateds (the Company) response to the comments of the
staff of the Division of Corporation Finance in your letter, dated
August 21, 2007, to Mr. Timothy H. Powers with respect
to the Companys Proxy Statement. For ease of reference each comment is
repeated in italics below and followed by the Companys response.
1. Provide the information required by Item 404(b) of Regulation S-K. For example, describe your
policies and procedures for the review, approval, or ratification of any transaction required to be
reported under Item 404(a), including, to the extent applicable, the material features described in
Item 404(b)(1).
The Company describes the Compensation Committee and Boards review of the relationships between
directors and the Company on page 9 of the Proxy Statement. In future filings the Company will
expand the discussion of its review of director independence and related party transactions to
include the information required by Item 404(b) of Regulation S-K including any review of any
transactions required to be reported under Item 404(a) of Regulation S-K.
Please be advised that the Company uses a Directors and Officers Questionnaire, updated annually
to reflect the adoption of new or amended rules, as well as compliance
certificates under the Code of Ethics described below, for the purpose of gathering information
needed for disclosure in its Proxy Statement and periodic reports. As noted on page 9 of the Proxy
Statement, certain directors serve as directors of companies, and in one instance as
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the president and chief operating officer of a company, that in the ordinary course of business
directly or indirectly purchase or supply goods to the Company or its subsidiaries or distributors.
Information about these transactions is regularly compiled and reviewed. The Companys Conflicts
of Interest Policy, Business Ethics Policy and Use of Undisclosed Information Statement (Code of
Ethics), posted on the Companys website at www.hubbell.com, applies to all employees,
officers and directors and specifically addresses related party transactions, conflicts of interest
and corporate opportunities in Section 400.1.
The Role of the Compensation Committee and Compensation Consultant, page 14
2. We note your reference to the compensation committees engagement of Hewitt Associates. You
state that Hewitt advises the compensation committee with respect to named executive officer
compensation. Describe in greater detail the nature and scope of Hewitts assignment and the
material elements of the instructions or directions given to the consultants with respect to the
performance of their duties under the engagement.
In future filings the Company will expand its disclosure regarding the nature and scope of the
compensation consultant and the material elements of the instructions and directions given to the
consultant with respect to the performance of its duties under its engagement.
In 2006, the Compensation Committee discussed its compensation philosophy with Hewitt, as described
in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis, but otherwise did not impose any specific limitations
or constraints on, or otherwise direct, the manner in which Hewitt performed its advisory services.
As advisor to the Compensation Committee, in 2006 Hewitt reviewed the total compensation strategy
and pay levels for the Companys named executive officers, examined all aspects of the Companys
executive compensation programs to ensure their ongoing support of the Companys business strategy,
ensured the Compensation Committee remained aware of developing legal and regulatory considerations
affecting executive compensation and benefit programs, and provided general counsel to the
Compensation Committee with respect to all compensation decisions pertaining to the Chief Executive
Officer and to all senior executive compensation recommendations submitted by management.
Benchmarking, page 14
3. You state that Hewitt provided to the compensation committee benchmark compensation data for
each element of the total direct compensation package and that such data is representative of pay
practices from among a community of over 200 companies in the U.S. general manufacturing sector.
You also state that to set pay for 2006, the compensation committee referred to compensation levels
within a group consisting of 19 companies selected jointly by the committee and Hewitt as being
representative of the electrical component and equipment industry in which you operate. Identify
all the companies with which you are engaged in benchmarking compensation of your named executive
officers, including if applicable, those companies that were the source of industry-specific survey
data that supplemented the peer data for your named executive officers. With respect to the 200
companies in the U.S. general manufacturing sector, discuss in your disclosure the degree to which
the compensation committee considered such companies comparable to you.
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In future filings the Company will identify the companies selected as being representative of the
electrical component and equipment industry (or such other specific companies or groups of
companies that the Company may use for benchmarking purposes in the future).
Please be advised that for 2006 the 19 electrical component and equipment industry companies used
for benchmarking purposes were:
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Acuity Brands Inc.
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Danaher Corp.
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L 3 Communications
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Stanley Works |
Amphenol Corp.
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Emerson Electric
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Molex Inc.
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Terex Corp. |
Carlisle Companies
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Flowserve Corp.
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Pall Corp.
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Thomas & Betts Corp. |
Cooper Industries
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General Cable Corp.
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Pentair Inc.
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Woodhead Industries |
Crane Co.
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ITT Industries Inc.
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SPX Corp. |
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With
respect to the database of over 200 general manufacturing companies
which the Company used
for benchmarking in 2006 and intends to use in the future, such group of companies is not compiled
by the consultant solely for the Company, and the Compensation Committee does not consider whether
or to what extent the included companies are comparable to the Company except with respect to their
being in general manufacturing. Rather, the Compensation Committees decision to benchmark
executive compensation levels to the practices of such general manufacturing companies, in addition
to the identified electrical component and equipment industry companies, reflects the fact that the
source and the destination of the Companys senior executive talent extends beyond the limited
community of electrical manufacturers and includes a wide range of other organizations in
manufacturing and services sectors outside the Companys traditional competitors for products and
services, which range is represented by such general manufacturing companies. Benchmarking pay to
both of these communities is intended to ensure that the Company is positioned to attract and
retain qualified senior executives in the face of competing pressures in the relevant labor
markets. Accordingly, although the Company will provide additional description of its use of such
data as set forth above, the Company respectfully submits that the identification and discussion of
over 200 companies used for this benchmarking purpose would not provide meaningful disclosure to
the Companys shareholders.
4. You state in the first whole paragraph on page 15 that the compensation committees review of
the data showed the companys total pay to be generally competitive with external market practices,
with some exceptions that were below market. In your discussion of base salary, you also state that
the company defines its market competitive position for base salaries as the 50th
percentile for both its industry specific peer group and other comparably sized companies across
general industry. Please disclose similar information with respect to your other elements of
compensation, providing not only the targeted percentiles but also the percentiles based on actual
compensation paid. For example, what were the targeted and actual percentiles of market represented
by your targeted and actual annual bonus paid in 2006?
In future filings the Company will expand its disclosure of all elements of compensation with
respect to targeted percentiles as well as actual compensation paid.
For 2006, as noted, the Company aimed to manage its executive compensation levels to the midpoint
of benchmark community practices. Overall base salary, total cash (base salary plus
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bonus), and total compensation (total cash plus the grant date value of long-term incentive
opportunities) expenditures were all targeted at the 50th percentile of benchmark
community practices. The Compensation Committees review of the competitive data in 2006 showed
that senior executive pay was positioned close to the target, as shown in the following table:
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Total |
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Base Salary |
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Total Cash |
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Compensation |
Target Position
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50th percentile
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50th percentile
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50th percentile |
Actual Position
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-2.2% below
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+0.3% above
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+4.2% above |
Incentive Compensation Plan, page 16.
5. Provide a more thorough analysis and discussion of the incentive compensation plan for your
named executive officers who are also group vice presidents to better explain how 2006 annual
incentive compensation was calculated. To the extent applicable, provide disclosure similar to that
found in the second whole paragraph on page 16 to explain the relationship between relative
achievement of performance objectives and actual bonus compensation. For example, with respect to
Mr. Muse, disclose how the two performance objectives of operating profit and trade working capital
are weighted in terms of their contribution to the 70% portion of his overall bonus eligibility,
the ranges of achievement for each such performance objective and how achievement of an objective
correlates to that objectives portion of the 70% portion of his overall bonus eligibility. On a
percentage basis what are the minimum, target and maximum levels of achievement for Mr. Muses
operating profit objective, and how would achievement of 110% of the target level affect that
particular objectives contribution to the 70% portion of his overall bonus eligibility? Please
consider including an example of how you determined a group vice presidents actual incentive bonus
based on his accomplishment of each of his four performance objectives. Also clarify what is meant
by the term overall bonus eligibility. Is this referring to the target bonus or the maximum bonus
of 200% of target bonus? If the former, explain how achievement of the various objectives could
result in a bonus in excess of the target bonus.
In future filings the Company will provide more detailed disclosure regarding how each named
executive officers annual incentive compensation was calculated for the year being discussed.
For your reference, in 2006, named executive officers who are also group vice presidents had three
distinct bonus objectives. Both of these individuals had a composite objective of operating profit
and trade working capital based upon the performance of his business unit (for Mr. Muse, the
lighting business (Lighting), and for Mr. Murphy, the wiring systems business (Wiring), each of
which is part of the Companys Electrical Segment). These objectives represented 70% of his overall
bonus eligibility, as indicated on page 16 of the Proxy Statement. The formula used to calculate
the value of the award was clearly defined by the Compensation Committee: operating profit made up 75% of the
composite measure and trade working capital comprised the other 25%. No incentive pay is delivered
if the performance is below 80% of the targeted objective, and the maximum incentive pay is
delivered if the performance is 120% or greater of the targeted objective. Focusing this portion
of these individuals bonus on operating profit and trade working
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capital results was deemed to promote decision making that would best increase the value of the business unit.
In the case of Mr. Muse, his business delivered operating profit equal to 82.4% of the stated
objective. This performance translated to a payout of 56% on the operating profit objective. Mr.
Muse received no incentive pay on the trade working capital portion of the composite measure
because his business did not achieve 80% of the stated objective. When blended together to form
the composite measure (75% weight of 56% operating profit payout plus 25% weight of 0.0% trade
working capital payout), Mr. Muse received a 42% payout on his composite measure. The remaining
30% of Mr. Muses overall bonus eligibility was split between an earnings per diluted share (EPS)
objective (as described on page 16 of the Proxy Statement) and a strategic objective related
specifically to a restructuring challenge within the Lighting business.
The Compensation Committee determined that such results corresponded to a financial performance
level of 61%. As a result, Mr. Muses actual bonus for 2006 was determined as shown in the
following table:
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Percent of Target |
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Performance |
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Earned |
Bonus |
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Measures |
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Result |
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Award |
70% |
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Operating profit and |
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42% |
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$80,796 |
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trade working capital |
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15% |
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EPS |
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90% |
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$37,100 |
15% |
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Strategic objective |
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120% |
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$49,467 |
Similarly, Mr. Murphys bonus comprised three portions, one of which reflected the Wiring business
operating profit and trade working capital and amounted to 70% of his target bonus opportunity, and
two separate strategic objectives based on the success of two new product introductions, each
representing 15% of his target bonus. The computation of each of the three elements of Mr. Murphys
bonus opportunity worked in the same manner as described above with respect to Mr. Muse. The
determination of Mr. Murphys bonus is illustrated below.
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Percent of Target |
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Performance |
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Earned |
Bonus |
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Measures |
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Result |
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Award |
70% |
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Operating profit and |
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50% |
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$71,563 |
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trade working capital |
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15% |
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Strategic objective #1 |
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100% |
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$30,487 |
15% |
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Strategic objective #2 |
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125% |
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$38,108 |
6. You have not provided a quantitative discussion of the terms of the necessary performance
objectives to be achieved in order for Messrs. Muse and Murphy, your named executive officers who
are also group vice presidents, to earn their incentive compensation. Please disclose the specific
operating profit, trade working capital and earnings per share targets, as well as the strategic
objectives for each individual, used to determine incentive amounts. Similarly, disclose both the
specific performance goals and targets set for Messrs. Powers and Nord pursuant to
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the Senior Executive Incentive Compensation Plan. To the extent you believe that disclosure of the specific
operating profit, trade working capital and earnings per share targets is not required because it
would result in competitive harm such that you may omit this information under Instruction 4 to
Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K, please provide on a
supplemental basis a detailed explanation for such conclusion. Please also disclose how difficult
it would be for the named executive officers or how likely it will be for you to achieve the
undisclosed target levels or other factors. General statements regarding the level of difficulty or
ease associated with achieving performance goals are not sufficient. In discussing how difficult it
will be for an executive or how likely it will be for you to achieve the target levels or other
factors, please provide as much detail as necessary without providing information that would result
in competitive harm.
In future filings the Company will continue to disclose the qualitative and quantitative measures
on which bonuses or other incentives are based, unless disclosure of the specific targets would
result in competitive harm such that it may omit this information
under Instruction 4 to
Item
402(b) of Regulation S-K. In that case, the Company will disclose how difficult it would be for
the named executive officer or how likely it will be for the Company to achieve the undisclosed
target levels or other factors.
With respect to the disclosure of the performance objectives underlying the incentive compensation
of Messrs. Muse and Murphy for 2006, the Proxy Statement disclosed the general nature of the
strategic objectives as well as targeted EPS numbers, since not only had the Company publicly
provided annual EPS guidance but such numbers at the time of such disclosure had no future impact
on the Company. The Company did not disclose the operating profit and trade working capital
objectives of the individual business units or the specifics of the strategic objectives of such
business units underlying such incentive compensation. The Company does not publicly release such
information because public disclosure would result in competitive harm. The electrical component
and equipment industry in which the Company operates is and will continue to be highly competitive.
Disclosure of a detailed quantification of operating profit and trade working capital objectives and the specifics of the
strategic objectives of the individual business units would not
provide shareholders with additional material insight into the
Companys business and growth strategies beyond what the Company
already discloses in its periodic reports, but would materially damage the Company by
assisting its competitors in assessing the Companys costs, pricing, cash flow and product performance, to
the Companys competitive disadvantage. This information falls squarely within the established
standards for what constitutes confidential commercial or financial information, the disclosure of
which would cause competitive harm as set forth in National Parks and Conservation Association v.
Morton,1 and the subsequent Court of Appeals decision following remand, National Parks
and Conservation Association v. Kleppe,2 cited in the FAQs of the Division of
Corporation Finance as addressing such standards.3
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1 |
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498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). |
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547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976). |
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Answer to Question 3.04 of its
Frequently Asked Questions with respect to Item 402 of Regulation S,
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/execcomp402interp.htm. A third
cited case, Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 931 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
vacated & rehg en banc granted, 942 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1991), grant of
summary judgment to agency affd en banc, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C.
Cir. 1992), is not directly on point as it dealt with information provided to the
government on a voluntary basis. |
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As explained in response to comment 5 discussed above, Mr. Muses bonus for 2006 was attributable
to the Lighting business performance with respect to operating profit and trade working capital
objectives, EPS and fulfillment of a strategic objective of the Lighting business. In
2006, the levels of operating profit and trade working capital performance that
reflected 100% performance for the Lighting business were not disclosed for the reason set forth
above. The level of EPS that represented 100% performance was $2.69, as noted in the Proxy
Statement. The strategic objectives were not formula driven, but reflected the Compensation
Committees judgment with respect to achievements relating to cost performance, timeliness of
facility closure and transfer of production, service metrics and communication.
In 2006, Mr. Murphys bonus was a function of the Wiring business operating profit and trade
working capital results (weighted at 70% of overall target bonus) and fulfillment of the Wiring
business strategic objectives, two separate new product introductions each weighted at 15% of
overall target bonus. The strategic objectives were not formula driven, but reflected the
Compensation Committees judgment with respect to achievements relating to net sales, sales force
training and effectiveness, and timeliness to market of new product introductions.
The
operating profit and trade working capital objectives for 2006 reflected the goals
set forth in the Companys strategic plan. Achievement of these goals was deemed by the
Compensation Committee to be 50% certain, meaning they were as likely to fall short of the target
as to exceed it. The strategic objectives for Messrs. Muse and Murphy, as well as for each other
individual in the 2006 plan, were selected by the Compensation Committee after identifying, with
relevant management, objectives that are critical for the success of such individuals business
unit within the Companys three business segments, or the segment as a whole, depending upon the
individuals position. These objectives vary by business and segment and relate to central elements
of each business or segments strategic plan. Because these objectives are central to the
business or segments achievement of plan, in general the likelihood of achievement approximates
the likelihood of achieving the quantitative targets. Thus, for 2006 achievement of these
objectives was deemed by the Compensation Committee to be 50% certain, as described above.
Bonuses for Messrs. Powers and Nord in 2006 were determined by the Compensation Committee under the
provisions of the Senior Executive Incentive Compensation Plan, using the same EPS target levels as
for participants in the Executive Incentive Compensation Plan. Bonuses for Messrs. Powers and Nord,
therefore, were a function of the Companys EPS generation in relation to a $2.69 target. A minimum
bonus equal to half of each executives target bonus was payable for $2.15 EPS; a maximum bonus
equal to 200% of each executives target bonus was payable for $3.23 EPS. Since actual EPS for 2006
was $2.59, the bonuses for Messrs. Powers and Nord were 90%.
7. You provide a description of how company performance affects compensation but only a general
discussion and little analysis of the effect of individual performance, even though your disclosure
suggests it is a factor considered by the compensation committee. For example, you state on page 16
that bonuses under the Incentive Compensation Plan also reflected the compensation committees
discretionary assessment of such individuals attainment of non-financial goals and strategic
goals, and you briefly discuss some non-financial goals in the third paragraph on page 17. You
state on page 17 that the compensation committee exercised its
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discretion to reduce bonuses under the Senior Executive Incentive Compensation Plan based on quantitative and qualitative criteria.
Please expand your disclosure to provide additional qualitative, and if applicable, quantitative
detail and an analysis of how individual performance contributed to actual 2006 compensation for
the named executive officers. For example, what
factors does the compensation committee consider in its assessment and, if applicable, how are they
weighted? Are certain factors or goals considered more determinative of compensation than others?
In future filings the Company will continue to provide and will expand its disclosure of
qualitative and, where applicable, quantitative factors, if any, used in determining individual
performance, with an analysis of how individual performance contributed to actual compensation paid
in the year being discussed in the Proxy Statement. However, if disclosure of specific factors
would result in competitive harm such that the Company may omit this information under Instruction
4 to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K, the Company will not disclose specific factors or targets, but
will instead disclose how difficult it would be for the named executive officer or how likely it
will be for the Company to achieve the undisclosed factors or targets. Please see the Companys
response to comment 6 above.
As stated on page 17 of the Proxy Statement, bonuses for Messrs. Powers and Nord in 2006 were
determined by the Compensation Committee under the provisions of the Senior Executive Incentive
Compensation Plan, a plan designed to meet the deduction requirements
of Section 162(m) of the
Internal Revenue Code. However, as allowed under the terms of the Senior Executive Incentive
Compensation Plan, the Compensation Committee could exercise discretion to reduce the maximum bonus
earned to reflect the bonus each executive would have received using one or more target levels as
for participants in the Executive Incentive Compensation Plan.
Accordingly, for 2006, the
Compensation Committee did exercise its discretion to reduce the maximum bonuses otherwise payable
under the Senior Executive Incentive Compensation Plan to the amount of bonus that Messrs. Powers
and Nord would have received based on the Companys EPS in relation to a $2.69 target, the same EPS
target levels as for participants in the Executive Incentive Compensation Plan, in order for their
total cash compensation to remain in line with the Compensation Committees targeted percentiles as described in
the response to comment 4 above.
8. You also state that the compensation committees discretionary judgment under the Incentive
Compensation Plan could increase or decrease the formulated award by as much as 25%, you note on
page 17 that the committee recognized the success the company had in achieving non-financial goals,
and you disclose on page 27 that Mr. Muses actual bonus payout was paid at 61% of target and Mr.
Murphys was paid at 69% of target. Disclose whether these percentages of target represent the
formulated awards or the awards after adjustment by the compensation committee. If the latter,
quantify such adjustment. Provide similar disclosure with respect to the committees use of
discretion to decrease the bonuses payable to Messrs. Power and Nord.
In future filings the Company will continue to include disclosure regarding the Compensation
Committees authority to use its discretionary judgment and will clarify when such judgment is
used. However, the Company respectfully submits that it would not provide meaningful disclosure,
if in fact the Compensation Committee did not exercise such discretion, to include statements to
that effect.
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Please be
advised that Messrs. Muse and Murphys incentive award for 2006, as discussed above and on
pages 16 and 17 of the Proxy Statement, represents the formulated awards and no discretionary
adjustments were made by the Compensation Committee. The Compensation
Committees use of discretion for Messrs. Powers and Nord is previously discussed in the answer to
comment 7 above, as well as on page 17 of the Proxy Statement.
Equity-Based Compensation, page 18
9. You state in the second paragraph on page 18 that the two performance measures are weighted
equally and that if the company were to achieve a relative total return to shareholders above the
80th percentile of the comparator group, 200% of the targeted shares would be paid, but
if performance was below the 35th percentile, no performance shares would be paid.
Clarify what is meant by the phrase targeted shares. For example, if the compensation committee
has awarded a particular named executive officer $300,000 in performance shares, and the companys
relative total return exceeds the 80th percentile of the comparator group, are you
suggesting that the officer will receive $600,000, representing 200% of the total award, or
$300,000, representing 200% of half the total award, since the two performance measures are
weighted equally?
In future filings the Company will include language to clarify that the phrase targeted shares
means such number of performance shares awarded, assuming both
measures (i.e. total return to shareholders and operating margin
improvement) are achieved at expected levels of performance. In the example, the Compensation Committee has awarded a particular
named executive officer a targeted award of $300,000 in performance
shares (of which $150,000 is measured against the total shareholder
return objective, and $150,000 is measured against the operating
margin improvement objective). If the Companys relative total
shareholder return
exceeds the 80th percentile of the comparator group, the officer will receive $300,000 worth of
shares representing 200% of one half of the total award of $300,000.
The officer may also receive additional shares based upon improvements in the Companys
operating margins, representing the other half of the performance share award as discussed on page 18
of the Proxy Statement.
10. You state on page 19 that in 2005, that you have adopted stock ownership guidelines applicable
to the named executive officers as well as other officers and designated employees. You indicate
on page 37 that you have also adopted stock ownership guidelines for all directors. Disclose the
specific guidelines for the named executive officers and directors and the period of time within
which the minimum share ownership level must be met. See Item 402(b)(2)(xiii) of Regulation S-K.
In the future the Company will disclose the specific guidelines and the period of time within which
the minimum share ownership level must be met.
The Companys Policy Regarding Stock Ownership and Retention by Officers and Designated Company
Personnel requires that officers and certain designated employees (Senior Employees), consistent
with their responsibilities to the shareholders of the Company, hold a significant equity interest
in the Company. The Board expects all Senior Employees to make a good faith effort, depending on
the circumstances, to attain a share ownership equal to their base salary multiplied by a certain
multiplier, and divided by the fair market value of the Companys Class B common stock on January
1, 2005, or $52.30 (Minimum Share Requirement). The
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multipliers
are as follows: (i) Chief Executive Officer four (4); (ii) Chief Financial Officer three (3); (iii) Group Vice Presidents
and other corporate officers two (2); and (iv) Vice
Presidents and General Managers one (1).
Officers and designated employees have five years from the earliest date on
which any option to acquire Company securities owned by such Senior Employee fully vests to meet
their minimum share requirements. Until the Minimum Share Requirement is met, and thereafter
whenever the Minimum Share Requirement is not complied with, a Senior
Employee must retain fifty percent
(50%) of all shares acquired pursuant to the exercise of a stock option (net of shares surrendered
for payment of exercise price and taxes). Once the Minimum Share Requirement is satisfied, the
Senior Employee must continue to satisfy such requirement for so long as he or she remains a Senior
Employee. Shares that count toward the Minimum Share Requirement include shares held outright by
the Senior Employee or by his or her spouse or minor children, shares held in trust for the benefit
of the Senior Employee or his or her spouse or minor children, and restricted stock held pursuant
to the 2005 Incentive Award Plan, or other equity compensation plan of the Company, but do not
include shares underlying unexercised options (whether or not vested).
The Companys Corporate Governance Guidelines, adopted by the Board of Directors on September 15,
2004, require that all directors hold a significant equity interest in the Company. The Board
expects that (i) all directors who are elected or appointed to the Board after the Companys May 6,
2002 Annual Meeting of Shareholders will (a) make a good faith effort, depending on the
circumstances, to own at least 1,000 shares of either class, or a combination of classes, of the
Companys common stock in sufficient time for such ownership to be documented in the proxy
statement which must be filed with the SEC immediately prior to such individuals proposed election
to the Board and (b) own, or acquire within five (5) years of first becoming a director, shares of
common stock of the Company (including share units under the Hubbell Incorporated Deferred
Compensation Plan for Directors, or any successor plan) having a market value, based upon the
aggregate purchase price, of at least three (3) times the average base annual retainer paid to such
director in the preceding five (5) years and (ii) all directors who were elected (or re-elected) at
the Companys Annual Meeting of Shareholders on May 6, 2002 will own, or acquire within five (5)
years of the effective date, shares of common stock of the Company (including share units under the
Hubbell Incorporated Deferred Compensation Plan for Directors, or any successor plan) having a
market value, based upon the aggregate purchase price, of at least three (3) times the average base
annual retainer paid to directors in the five (5) years immediately following the effective date.
Post-Employment and Change of Control Benefits, page 20
11. Expand your disclosure of your severance policy, continuity agreements and change of control
provisions to include a more thorough discussion of Item 402(b)(1) of Regulation S-K. Discuss how
each of these compensation components and your decisions regarding these elements fit into your
overall compensation objectives and affect decisions regarding other elements. Also analyze why
you structured these agreements in the manner summarized on pages 20-22 and 32-35. For example,
discuss why only the continuity agreements for Messrs. Powers and Davies define good reason to
include any election by the executive to terminate employment during a thirty-day period following
the first anniversary of the change in control (or, for Mr. Powers only, following his 65th
birthday). Also discuss why you chose to provide benefits such as a lump sum payment equal to
three times the sum of base salary and annual bonus, the acceleration of vesting
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in
all options, stock appreciation rights and restricted stock awards and the determination that performance shares
would be payable at the target level of the award.
In future filings the Company will expand its disclosure of its severance policy, continuity
agreements and change in control provisions to include a more thorough discussion of Item 402(b)(1)
of Regulation S-K.
In addition to retirement benefits, the Company provides for certain severance benefits in the
event an executives employment is involuntarily or constructively terminated. Such severance
benefits are designed to alleviate the financial impact of an involuntary termination through
salary and health benefit continuation, as well as outplacement
services, and with the intent of
providing for a stable work environment. In addition to normal severance, the Company provides
enhanced benefits in the event of a change in control as a means of reinforcing and encouraging the
continued attention and dedication of key executives of the Company to their duties of employment
without personal distraction or conflict of interest in circumstances which could arise from the
occurrence of a change in control.
The
Company extends severance, continuity, and change in control benefits because they are essential
to help the Company fulfill its objectives of attracting and retaining key managerial talent. The
decision to offer these benefits in 2006 did not influence the Compensation Committees
determinations concerning other direct compensation or benefit levels. In making the decision to
extend the benefits, the Compensation Committee relied on the assurances of its independent advisor
that the programs are representative of market practice, both in terms of design and cost. For
example, the Compensation Committees review of prevailing practices elsewhere demonstrated that
the magnitude of the lump sum cash benefits payable following certain change-related terminations
(3 times salary plus bonus) reflects general industry standards. Similarly, the promise to
accelerate vesting in all outstanding stock awards also is emblematic of external norms. The
Compensation Committee determined that extending these competitive benefits is necessary to attract
and retain top quality executive talent.
Messrs. Powers and Davies are allowed to terminate their employment voluntarily during any thirty
day period following the first anniversary of a change in control. This provision was designed to
require our highest level executives to stay on for at least a year (or, if earlier to age 65 in
the case of Mr. Powers) following a change in control. At the time Messrs. Powers and Davies
originally entered into their agreements in 1999, the Company believed that a change in control
would likely result in an immediate adverse diminution of these executives duties or status, thus
they would immediately have a constructive termination and would be able to receive severance
benefits at such time. However, upon further review in 2005, the Company thought that the
continued services of management might be desirous following a change in control in order to
provide for a better transition. Accordingly, in 2005 the agreements were modified to provide that
no diminution of duties would be deemed to have occurred solely due to the Company ceasing to be a
public company or becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of another company, thereby eliminating an
automatic constructive termination of the executives just by reason of a change in control. In
addition, these executives were allowed the right to terminate their employment for any reason
during the thirty day period following the first anniversary of a change in control, which
preserved their walk away rights and still provided any acquirer with a possible transition of
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services. Mr. Powers also has the right to terminate at sixty-five if earlier, as that was a
provision his predecessor had under his Continuity Agreement and the Board wanted to make sure that
Mr. Powers agreement was substantially similar to his
predecessors.
12. Supplement your disclosure to clarify the relationship between the continuity agreements
discussed in the second paragraph on page 21 and the severance policy and change of control
provisions discussed in the last paragraph on page 21. As currently written, it is unclear whether
these benefits are both available to named executive officers, and if so, whether and why they
provide overlapping benefits.
In future filings the Company will clarify that if a named executive officer is entitled to receive
benefits under a Continuity Agreement, he is not also eligible to receive severance benefits under
any other Company severance policy. However, if such termination is not in connection with a
change in control and, therefore, the Continuity Agreements are not applicable, then the named
executive officer will receive severance benefits provided under an applicable severance policy.
13. You state on page 19 that the benefits payable under the continuity agreements include, among
other items, enhanced benefits under the companys SERP. Expand this discussion to describe these
benefits or provide a reference to a more detailed discussion elsewhere in your proxy statement.
In future filings the Company will provide a cross reference to the discussion of the SERP
(contained on pages 31 and 32 of the Proxy Statement) and clarify that an executive who receives
benefits under the Continuity Agreements will become entitled to a SERP benefit regardless of his
age and years of service. His SERP benefit will also be calculated based on his full years of
service, but if his service is less than five years, he will be credited with at least five years
of service. Additionally, such executives SERP benefit will not be reduced actuarially for early
payment.
Summary Compensation Table for Fiscal Year 2006, page 24
The Compensation Discussion and Analysis should be sufficiently precise to identify material
differences in compensation policies with respect to individual named executive officers. Refer to
Section II.B.1. of Commission Release No. 33-8732A. For example, we note the disparity between
your chief executive officers base salary and that of the other named executive officers. We also
note the stock and option awards and future target level payouts under non-equity incentive plan
awards granted to your chief executive officer noted in the table on page 26 as compared to the
lesser awards granted to the other named executive officers. We also refer you to the size of Mr.
Powers pension benefits indicated in the table on page 30 as compared to the pension benefits of
the other named executive officers. Please provide a more detailed discussion of how and why your
chief executive officers compensation differs from that of the other named executive officers.
The Company respectfully submits that the Compensation Discussion and Analysis contained in the
Proxy Statement already sufficiently identifies any material differences in compensation policies
with respect to any individual named executive officer. Unless already specifically
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discussed in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis section of the Proxy Statement, there were no differences
in the compensation policies with respect to individual named executive officers in 2006.
Please be advised that the disparity in the chief executive officers compensation to the other
named executive officers reflects the fact that the Company has benchmarked Mr. Powers total
compensation to the 50th percentile of chief executive officers of the benchmarked
groups of companies (discussed above in response to comment 3), and not towards any internal pay
equity standards. Although, as part of its annual review of Mr. Powers compensation, the
Compensation Committee reviews the relationship that exists between Mr. Powers pay and the
compensation extended to the other named executive officers, its decisions are driven more by
competitive pay practices for chief executive officers than by the relationship of Mr. Powers pay
to that of his direct reports. Accordingly, the amount of Mr. Powers compensation is higher than
the other named executive officers, as it is reflective of the competitive market for chief
executive officer services and not because of any different compensation policies than are applied
to the other named executive officers.
Any distinction between Mr. Powers pension benefit and
those accruing to the named executive officers is merely a function of the Companys pension
formula. The Compensation Committee does not engage in annual decision making with respect to the
magnitude of any pension benefit.
* * *
Hubbell Incorporated acknowledges that it is responsible for the adequacy and accuracy of the
disclosure in its filing; staff comments or changes to disclosure in response to comments do not
foreclose the Commission from taking any action with respect to the filing; and Hubbell
Incorporated may not assert staff comments as a defense in any proceeding initiated by the
Commission or any person under the federal securities laws of the United States.
If you have any questions or comments in connection with this response please call the undersigned
at (203) 799-4230, or Erica Steinberger of Latham & Watkins LLP at (212) 906-1306.
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Very truly yours,
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/s/ Richard W. Davies
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Richard W. Davies |
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Vice President, General Counsel and
Secretary |
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cc: |
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Timothy H. Powers
Erica Steinberger |
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